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Spatial Dimension of Externalities and the Coase 
Theorem: Implications for Co-existence of Transgenic 
Crops 
 
Abstract: 
Adopters of transgenic crops produce a negative externality for producers of transgenic 
free crops through potential pollen flow. Producers of transgenic free crops produce a 
negative externality for growers of transgenic crops if they call for keeping a minimum 
distance. This paper examines spatial implications of co-existence of transgenic crops 
from the perspective of Ronald Coase’s influential paper “The Problem of Social Cost” 
published in 1960. First, the problem of co-existence will be assessed as a problem of 
social cost. Second, we discuss the impact of the distribution of different property rights 
on the adoption of transgenic crops. Third, we show that allocations of property rights 
result in different spatial agglomeration of transgenic and non-transgenic crops. 
 
Keywords: Coase Theorem, Co-existence, Externalities, Property rights, Spatial effects, 
Transgenic Crops. 
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1 Introduction 
“No form of agriculture should be excluded in the EU.” Many observers see this recent 
statement by European agricultural commissioner Franz Fischler as a clear signal towards 
a nearby lifting of the quasi EU moratorium on transgenic crops (or GMs for short) 
launched in 1998 (European Commission 2003). One of the last obstacles towards lifting 
the moratorium, however, is the problem of coexistence. How can GM-crops and non-
GM-crops coexist? Since the European Environmental Agency published its report on 
“Genetically modified organisms (GMOs): The significance of gene flow through pollen 
transfer” (EEA 2002) the debate has focused on the external effects that GM-farmers may 
cause to non-GM farmers if accidental pollen transfer takes place. While strong 
supporters of the GM technology argue that the current legislation is sufficient to deal 
with this problem (e.g. EuropaBio 2003), others demand strict liability rules for GM-
farmers and those who distribute GM-crops. Furthermore, elaborated monitoring systems, 
GM-crop cadastre and other measures should be established according to their view (e.g. 
Greenpeace & Zukunftsstiftung Landwirtschaft 2003). The discussion on coexistence and 
private liability for GM-technology, however, is not limited to Europe. There are ongoing 
debates in the United States, Canada, New Zealand and other countries (see e.g. Smyth, 
Khachatourians and Phillips 2002; Kershen 2002; Conner 2003). Thus, the governance of 
the future co-existence of GM-crops, conventional crops and organic crops is becoming a 
burning issue. 
This paper examines the current debate on co-existence from the perspective of 
Ronald Coase’s influential paper “The Problem of Social Cost” published in 1960 (Coase 
1960). Coase was very sceptical about the role of the government for resolving “harmful 
effects”. He argued, first, that the traditional perception of the problem - making the 
polluter liable or taxing pollution - is misleading because it ignores the reciprocity of the 
problem. Second, he stated that if property rights are well defined and the costs of using 
the market to reallocate property rights are zero or close to zero, the allocation of 
resources will be independent of the initial distribution of rights. This statement became 
known as the Coase Theorem (see Cooter 1991; Posner 1993). Third, Coase noticed that 
if the costs of using the market to reallocate property rights are not close to zero, all 
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institutional alternatives or governance structures must be evaluated in a comparative 
way, including the “costs involved in operating the various social arrangements” (Coase 
1960: 44). 
This contribution will basically proceed in the logic of Coase’s paper but will 
highlight the possible implications of the Coase-Theorem for the governance of co-
existence and its implications for the spatial allocation of GM and non-GM crops.  
First, we characterize the problem of co-existence as a problem of social cost that can 
be solved institutionally as well as technically. Second, we analyze the impact of 
different property right structures on the adoption of GM crops and on the value of GM 
and non-GM production. We will show that under certain assumptions the adoption of 
GM crops is independent from the allocation of property and liability rights. In this case, 
technical and managerial solutions may be adopted to solve the problems of co-existence. 
However, the values of different production systems are highly affected by the allocation 
of liability rights. Fourth, the implications of these for the spatial allocation of GM and 
non-GM farms are discussed.  
 
2 Assessing the Problem of Co-existence 
The problem of co-existence is a classical “problem of social costs”. Farmers who plant 
GM crops may cause negative (or positive) external effects to non-GM or organic 
farmers by cross contamination through pollen drift or other forms of admixture. The 
problem is illustrated in Figure 1.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Let us consider two supply chains that range from seed production over processing to the 
final consumer. At each stage, possible accidental contaminations across interfaces are 
possible. The contamination, in principle, can be two sided. GM crops may affect non-
GM crops but non-GM crops may also affect GM crops. It is important to note here that 
the same physical effect, i.e. pollen flow, can have different economic impacts, 
depending on the institutional setting. The institutional and regulatory setting defines the 
rules of what is or is not to be labelled as GM and sets the threshold levels for labelling 
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(Smyth and Phillips 2003). The lower the threshold levels the higher the costs of 
governance and possible economic losses. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
definition of the threshold is subject to strong political debate. In the EU the current food-
labelling threshold is 1% (EU, 2000)2. However, the European Council agreement on GM 
Food and Feed proposal established a 0.9% threshold for food and feed. For seeds, the 
Commission is proposing even lower thresholds (EU, 2003). These thresholds are low 
and the likelihood of contamination is high. It should be noted that the labelling regime is 
different in the United States where market actors can voluntarily label food as GMO free 
(see Crespi and Marette 2003 for an overview of different labelling policies). In this case 
market participants define the thresholds, which can vary substantially. Thus, the problem 
of co-existence is also a problem of governing the flow of goods and services and bads 
and disservices along the supply chain. However, governance structures are not without 
costs and these costs have to be taken into account when approaching the problem. The 
specific admixture through pollen drift, the spatial problem, occurs at the stage of seed 
and plant production. 
 
2.2 A simple model 
Think about a region that consists of a number of farms i= 1,…,k, which show similar 
cropping patterns and share several borderlines and initially grow only one crop. Further, 
assume a situation similar to the one observed in Europe: only non-GM crops are grown. 
The regional value of non-GM production  is then given by  NV
N N NV p Q C= − N
)N
                                                
 (1a) 
(
1 1
i i i
k k
N N N N i
i i
V v p q c
= =
= = −∑ ∑  (1b) 
 
2 It should be noted here that for organic farming no threshold has been decided yet. It is usually assumed 
that the relevant threshold is at the detection level that is currently 0.1 %. 
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where Np , , and  are the respective price, quantity and cost vectors for non-GM 
products at the regional level. Further,  indicates the farm level value of non-GM 
production and , ,  are the respective farm level price, quantity and cost vectors.  
NQ NC
iN
v
iN
p
iN
q
iN
c
If all farmers in the region were to shift to the GM-crop variety, e.g. from corn to Bt-
corn, the regional value of GM-crop production, , is given by: GV
GGGG CQpV −=  (2a) 
∑ ∑
= =
−==
k
i
iGiGiG
k
i
GG cqpvV i
1 1
 (2b) 
with , , and  as the respective price, quantity and costs vectors of GM-crops at 
the regional level. Again represents the farm level value of GM production and , 
,  are the respective price, quantity and cost vectors for GM crops at the individual 
farm level.  
Gp GQ GC
iG
v
iG
p
iG
q
iG
c
Since it is expected that consumers are willing to pay a price premium for GM-free 
food, we assume further that the farm gate price of non-GM crops is universally higher 
than for GM crops3. This assumption is represented by the equation (3): 
, 1,...,
i iN G
p p i> ∀ = k
iN
                                                
 (3) 
If the farm gate prices of GM-crops are assumed to be below non-GM crops, GM-crops 
must allow for sufficient cost reductions or yield increases in order to be attractive to be 
grown. At least for one farmer the value of GM crop production must exceed the value of 
non-GM crops, . Otherwise GM-crops will not be grown. Figure 2 shows the 
borderline between farms that will adopt GM-crops and those that will not. A farm will 
only adopt GM-crops if the value exceeds the value of non-GM crops and not otherwise. 
iG
v v>
 
 [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
3 However, there is no reason to believe that this should always be the case. It is also possible that the price 
of GM-food exceeds the price for non-GM products. In the following, however, we will not consider this 
case. 
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 Assume now, that the whole group of k farmers could be divided into two different 
subgroups. The first group, , say group A, has a comparative advantage in non-
GM crop production, ; the second group 
h,,i K1=
N Giv v≥ i k,,hki K−= , say group B, has a 
comparative advantage in GM crop production, .
iG N
v v>
i
G
                                                
4 Farms belonging to group A 
with  are indicated with the small letter a and farms belonging to group B with 
 with the small letter b. Different regions may show a different population 
structure with regard to the type of farms. One region may be populated mostly with type 
A farmers, another region mostly with type B farmers, and a third region may be equally 
populated by type A and B farmers. If the latter is the case, then the co-existence of both 
farm types, if it can be established cost free, will be socially preferable compared to the 
status quo and to the unified adoption of GM-crops, since the value of co-existence in the 
region, VC, will exceed the value of uniform adoption represented by equation (4): 
h,,i K1=
k,,hki K−=
1
,
= = −
= + >∑ ∑a bh kN G N
a b k h
VC v v V V  (4) 
 
2.2 Co-existence, Economic Damage and Technical Measures 
Equation (4) assumes that there is no co-existence problem. However, if accidental pollen 
transfer from GM crops to non-GM crops occurs, the non-GM farmer may face the risk 
that his non-GM crops will be contaminated with pollen from GM crops. If, as a 
consequence, he cannot sell his product at a price premium, he will face an economic loss 
or damage, da. The occurrence and magnitude of the economic damages is influenced by 
a number of factors represented in equation (5a). 
 
 
4 This does not imply that the alternative non-GM crop will be of the same variety. It includes cases such as 
Bt-corn in comparison to non-GM spring wheat, e.g. 
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1
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D d
=
= ∑  (5b) 
The occurrence of the damage at the individual non-GM farm, , is determined by (1) 
the quantity of GM-crops grown in the region , (2) the diffusion coefficient 
ad
GQ aNα  that 
indicates the farm and crop specific impact of pollen drifts from GM crops to non-GM 
crops and (3) the threshold for the good being defined as GM or non-GM T. As it was 
already argued, the threshold T is an important factor for the occurrence of economic 
damage. Economic damage occurs only if the fraction of GM crops in non-GM crops 
exceeds the threshold level. The magnitude of the damage is influenced by (1) the price 
difference,  and the (2) quantity  of non-GM products affected. The 
damage, of course, is zero if the quantity of GM crops or non-GM crops is zero, if the 
price difference is zero or if the contamination is always below the threshold level. The 
total damage in the region, D, is the sum of the farm level damages, d
aN
p p−
aG aN
q
a. 
The diffusion coefficient is of specific importance here. This coefficient can be 
influenced by different technical measures and management practices, i.e. by isolation 
distances between fields, buffer zones, pollen barriers, crop rotation systems or by 
genetic use restricted technologies (GURT) such as infertile pollen (e.g. van de Wiel et 
al., 2005). These management practices are either related to border management or to the 
spatial and temporal co-ordination of agricultural activities and can be subsumed as 
fencing activities. However, influencing the diffusion coefficient requires the 
introduction of different management practices and is connected with additional costs. If 
we denote  as the farm-level management practices that are ranked and  as the farm-
level fencing costs of these practices, the following relationships are assumed: 
im if
)m,m( ikiii −α=α  (6a) 
( , , , , )
ii i i N G N Gi
f f m q q Q Q=  (6b) 
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1 1= = = −
= = +∑ ∑ ∑k h ki a
i a b k h
bF f f f
G
                                                
 (6c) 
The diffusion coefficient at the farm level is influenced by the farm management 
practices  but also by the management practices of all other farms. Let us take the 
example of the buffer zone as one management system and two neighbouring farms. The 
diffusion coefficient can be reduced if the buffer zone is implemented by a farm that 
grows non-GM crops and it will be reduced even more if the GM crop farm establishes a 
buffer zone as well. However, equation (6a) indicates that there is a coordination problem 
due to the management practices adopted by different farms. The variable costs of 
establishing the management and fencing systems as in equation (6b) are not only 
dependent on the management practices of the farmer, m
im
i, but also on the quantity of non-
GM and/or GM crops grown on the farm and the quantity of non-GM crops and GM 
crops grown in the region. To give an example, it makes a difference if a non-GM farm is 
surrounded by one GM farmer and four non-GM farmers or by five GM-farmers. Finally, 
the management and fencing costs in the region are the sum of the individual 
management and fencing costs as indicated by equation (6c). Through coordinated action 
farmers may reduce damage and/or fencing costs. They can agree on voluntary solutions 
such as different rotation practices, planting times or buffer zones. These co-ordination 
activities are not cost free because of transaction costs. Here, we will differentiate 
between two situations: one, where the transaction costs are prohibitively high and one, 
where the transaction costs are zero.5  
Considering the additional costs discussed above except for the transaction costs 
equation (4) can now be rewritten: 
1 1 1
,
= = − = =
= + − − >∑ ∑ ∑ ∑i ih k k kN G i i N
i i k h i i
VC v v d f V V  (7) 
Now, the regional value of co-existence is the sum of the values of GM and non-GM 
crops at the farm level minus the sum of damage and/or fencing costs. Equation (7) 
 
5 For an analysis explicitly considering positive transaction costs that are not prohibitively high, consult 
Beckmann and Wesseler (2005a). 
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reflects the sum of the individual decisions. These individual decisions are affected by the 
distribution of liability rights as shown in the remaining part of the paper. 
 
2.3 Liability Rights and Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
To incorporate different distributions of property rights in the form of liability rights in 
the analysis, let us denote  as the farm level co-existence value of non-GM crops and 
 as the farm level co-existence value of GM crops. We introduce a superscript ℓ that 
indicates if the GM-farmer is liable for the damages he causes and n if he is not. We 
assume further, first, that there are no additional costs of holding the GM farmer liable 
and hence there is no uncertainty involved in proving admixture and, second, that 
transaction costs between GM and non-GM farmers are prohibitively high. Under this 
setting two different liability systems are discussed.  
iN
vc
iG
vc
 
GM farmer not liable 
If farmers have the unrestricted right to grow GM crops and are not liable, every farmer 
switching to GM technology will reduce the value of non-GM crops on fields in the 
neighbourhood due to damages from the GM field. The co-existence value of non-GM 
farming of farm i, , will be reduced if neighbouring farms plant GM crops by the 
expected damage  and/or by the costs 
i
n
Nvc
id if  of the management and fencing practices that 
prevent potential damages. The co-existence value of GM farming, however, does not 
change for farmer i:  
i i
n
N N ivc v d f= − − i
iG
i
n
N
 (8a) 
i
n
Gvc v=  (8b) 
Farmer i will now choose to plant GM crops, if . The distribution of rights and 
therefore costs and benefits as indicated by equation (8a) and (8b) can be assumed not 
only to influence distribution of economic benefits but also technology adaptation and 
investments in the management and fencing system. Under the circumstances described, 
i
n
Gvc vc>
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a GM farmer has no incentive to invest in management and fencing practices that prevent 
damages. The non-GM farmer, however, has an incentive to invest in management 
systems that prevent damages. Cost minimizing behaviour requires that the non-GM 
farmer introduces management technologies up to the level where the marginal costs of 
these technologies are equal to the marginal damages. If the damage and/or the 
management and fencing costs exceed the incremental value of non-GM crops, 
, the farmer will stop non-GM production. Thus, this type of liability 
rights increases the adoption rate of GM technology. However, as long as the equation 
does not hold for all farmers in group A, non-GM crop farming will not disappear. 
ii i N G
d f v v+ > −
i
iN
i
                                                
This is illustrated in Figure 3. The borderline between GM and non GM farmers 
moves downwards. All farmers that are still to the right of the new borderline will 
continue planting non-GM crops. Those farmers that now find themselves to the left of 
the new borderline will switch to GM crops.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
GM farmer liable 
The costs are distributed in a different way if the potential GM-farmer is liable. If the GM 
farmer causes damages to the non-GM farmer, he has to pay compensation payments 
 at the rate of the damage. The damage could be caused on more than one farm.
iG
cp 6 The 
compensation payment sets incentives for the GM farmer to undertake managing and 
fencing practices that reduce the damages. The value of GM farming therefore will be 
reduced by the compensation payments and the fencing costs. The value of non-GM 
farming will remain the same since the damage is fully compensated by the GM farmer.  
iN
vc v=l  (9a) 
i i iG G G
vc v cp f= − −l  (9b) 
 
6 For simplicity we assume that the source of GM-pollen can be clearly identified, a system similar to the 
German one with total liable adhesion. The quality of our results does not change, if we assume that a 
group of farmers will be held liable, such as under the Danish system, only the compensation payment per 
GM farmer will be reduced. 
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If the expected compensation payments for economic damages and/or the fencing costs 
exceed the value of GM production, G i G Ni icp f v v i+ > − , GM crops will be prevented 
from being grown. This situation is illustrated by an upward move of the borderline in 
figure 3. Farmers that were to the left of the borderline before the introduction of liability 
rules and are to the right of the borderline after the upward move do not plant GM crops. 
However, they would have done so without the liability risk. 
In this section we have assumed that transaction costs are prohibitively high and 
therefore no negotiation and coordination between GM and non-GM farmers takes place. 
In the next chapter we will analyse the case of zero transaction costs.  
 
3 Co-existence: A Coasian View 
Economists have two different readings of Coase’s paper “The Problem of Social Costs” 
which are important to note here. The first reading is that Coase was purely in favour of 
private bargaining solutions of the problem of social costs. Under the assumption that the 
“costs of using the price mechanism” are zero or negligible, he argued that private 
bargaining would lead to efficient outcomes independent of the distribution of property 
rights. 7 This came to be known as the Coase Theorem. The only role of the government 
is to assign the property rights and there is nothing for the government to add. This point 
of view is usually labelled the Coasian view (Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer 2001). The 
second reading is that Coase advocates a comparative institutional analysis of all possible 
relevant alternatives taking the costs of operating various social arrangements into 
account. All organizational alternatives such as markets, firms, laws, and regulations 
have different benefits and costs and these have to be accounted for. As Coase argued in 
his Nobel lecture (1992) the introduction of the comparative institutional view was his 
main intention (see also Ellickson 1991; Williamson 1995, and Claeser, Johnson and 
Shleifer 2001).  
                                                 
7 We note that compensation payments may change preferences of individuals and result in different forms 
of allocating goods. The outcome is still efficient (Perman et al., 2003). But, in our case we look at profit 
maximizing farms. 
 14
The following sections will discuss the problem of co-existence from both points of 
view. However, it will also be argued that both perspectives have their limitations 
because they ignore the distributional conflicts involved in assigning property rights and 
establishing governance structures. Further, it is assumed that farmer’s know already 
whether or not it is profitable to grow either GM or non-GM crops ignoring damage 
costs. 
 
3.1 Efficient Allocation 
In order to repeat the result of the Coase Theorem for the case of GM-crops, let us first 
assume that the GM-farmer is perfectly liable for the possible damages he causes. Thus 
we are considering equation (9b). The GM farmer has to pay compensation equivalent to 
the damage caused  or he has to invest in technologies in order to prevent 
damages. The value-maximizing amount of GM-crops grown will be determined where 
the marginal value of growing GM-crops equals the marginal damages. 
bG
cp d= a
a
Now, let us assume that the GM-farmer has the unrestricted right to grow GM crops. 
He is not liable and does not bear any costs of cross contamination. A naïve interpretation 
would be that the GM farmer now has an incentive to expand GM crops until the 
marginal value is equal to zero. At this point he will cause a damage of . However, if 
the costs of using the price system are zero, the non-GM farmer will negotiate and be 
willing to pay for the reduction of damages in order to prevent the GM-farmer from 
growing GM-plants, . Thus the willingness to pay for reduced damages 
creates an opportunity cost for the GM-farmer. If the GM farmer reduces the amount of 
GM-crops grown he will be compensated by the non-GM farmer. The amount will be 
reduced until the marginal benefits from planting GM crops are equal to the 
compensation payments, which are equal to the marginal damage cost. 
'd
'
aN a
cp d d= −
In conclusion, no liability as well as liability of GM farms will result in efficient 
allocation of GM and non-GM crops. This is the core argument of the Coase Theorem.  
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3. 2 Spatial Implications 
The spatial allocation of GM and non-GM crops will be affected by the distribution of 
liability rights. A farmer will not adopt GM crops if the expected value is less than the 
expected value of non-GM crops, i.e. 0
i iN G
v v− >  but he also has to consider the damage 
and/or fencing costs. The non-GM farmer’s willingness to pay compensation to the GM 
farmer in order to prevent damages has limits. The first limit is given by the incremental 
value of growing non-GM corps. If the expected damage exceeds the incremental value 
of non-GM crops, the non-GM farmer will quit non-GM farming instead of paying 
compensation. The second limit is given by the costs for a technical solution to the 
problem. Given these two limits the following three situations are possible: 
 
a a b b
n n
N G G N av v v v d f− > − < + a
a
a
 
non-GM farmer compensates GM farmer for 
not growing GM crops 
(10a)
,
a a b b
n n
N G G N av v v v d f− − > +  non-GM farmer accepts damages and/or 
undertakes fencing 
(10b)
b b a a
n n
G N N G av v v v d f− > − < +  non-GM farmer switches to GM farming (10c)
 
The situation explained in equations 10a, 10b, 10c is summarized in figure 4. The 
horizontal axis indicates the incremental benefits for non-GM farms and the vertical axis 
the incremental benefits for GM-farms. The 45-degree line is the boundary where 
possible compensation payments equal incremental benefits. Take a point above the 45-
degree line. There the GM farmer could compensate the non-GM farmer for not growing 
GM and still maintain a profit. Damage and fencing costs are introduced by the vertical 
line da+fa. Equation (10a) describes the area to the right of the 45-degree line and below 
the dotted line. In this case the GM farmer will become a non-GM farmer and result in 
spatial agglomeration of non-GM farms. Equation (10b) describes the area above the 
dotted line and to the right of the vertical line da+fa. In this case there are no spatial 
agglomeration effects and GM and non-GM farms will coexist. Equation (10c) describes 
the area above the 45-degree line and to the left of the vertical line da+fa. In this area  the 
incremental benefits from staying non-GM are less than the damages and fencing costs 
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from neighbouring GM farms, and farmers switch to growing GM crops. In this case a 
spatial agglomeration of GM crops can be observed. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
If the GM farmer is liable for possible damages, he will only be willing to plant GM-
crops as long as the compensation payment  does not exceed the incremental value of 
GM production or the cost of fencing investments. The farmer’s decision can be 
illustrated in the following three arrangements
iG
cp
8: 
 
− > − < +l l
b b a a bG N N G G
v v v v cp fb
b
a
l
                                                
 
GM farmer will compensate non-GM farmer 
for not growing non-GM 
(11a)
b b a a bG N N G G
v v v v cp f− > − > +l l GM farmer compensates the non-GM farmer 
and/or undertakes fencing  
(11b)
b b b aG N G b N G
v v cp f v v− < + < −l  GM farmer will switch to non-GM crops  (11c)
 
The situation explained in equations 11a, 11b, 11c is summarized in figure 5. Now, the 
damage and fencing costs are introduced by the horizontal line cpb+fb. Equation (11a) 
describes the area above the 45-degree line and to the left of the dotted line. In this area 
the GM farmer will compensate non-GM farmers for not planting non-GM crops and the 
non-GM farmer will start planting GM crops. This leads to an agglomeration of GM 
farms. Equation (11b) describes the area to the right of the dotted line and above the 
cpb+fb line. In this area the GM farmer will compensate the non-GM farmer for the 
damages and/or invest in fencing but neither will change their crops and GM and non-
GM farms will coexist. Equation (11c) describes the area below the 45-degree and cpb+fb 
line. In this area the GM farmer will switch to non-GM crops as the damage costs are 
higher than incremental benefits from GM crops resulting in a spatial agglomeration of 
non-GM farms. 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 
8 Please note, that equations 10a 10b, 10c and 11a, 11b, 11c imply a negative attitude of farmers towards 
GM crops. 
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In both cases, with and without liability, incentives for spatial agglomeration exist. If 
fencing and damage costs in both cases are the same, the spatial agglomeration will be 
the same as well. As farms are heterogeneous, it is reasonable to assume that damage and 
fencing costs differ between farms. Further, the diffusion coefficient α will depend, 
among others, on the local geography and will result in different damage and fencing 
costs between farms. Also, the costs of buffer-zones, as one possible fencing mechanism, 
decrease with farm size (Soregaroli and Wesseler, 2005). This indicates that the liability 
system can result in different spatial distribution of GM crops. 
The results presented in equations 10a, 10b, 10c and equations 11a, 11b, and 11c have 
additional implications for the spatial distribution of transgenic crops to the ones already 
mentioned. In the case where GM farmers are not liable for cross pollination of 
neighbouring fields, incentives for non-GM farmers to cooperate and organize GM free 
zones exist. Collaboration with neighbouring non-GM farmers increases the total area of 
non-GM crops and reduces the average damage per unit of area as the average distance to 
fields with GM crops increases. Also, fencing costs decrease. As we assume that 
transaction costs are zero the results will change with positive transaction costs. The 
transaction costs will increase with the number of farmers participating in the GM free 
zone. The higher the transaction costs the smaller the number of participating farmers 
will be. 
With the introduction of a liability rule for GM-farmers, incentives change. Now, GM-
farmers have an economic incentive to collaborate and organize GM crop zones. The 
average damage costs per unit of area can be reduced. Each additional unit of land 
increases the amount of land within the minimum distance to non-GM crops. As a result, 
agglomeration of land planted with GM crops is further enforced. 
 
3.3 Distributional Implications 
Even though resources are allocated efficiently under the two liability systems, they have 
distributional implications. In the case where GM farmers are held liable, they have to 
shoulder additional costs. The compensation payments non-GM farmers receive cover the 
additional costs. In this case the non-GM farmers will not gain economically. Even 
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though the GM-farmer has to bear additional costs in the form of the compensation 
payment, he will still be better off than in the case without the availability of GM crops. 
In the case where the GM farmer is not liable, he receives the full gain from planting GM 
crops, but the non-GM farmer has to bear costs and his economic situation will be worse 
than before the introduction of GM crops. Holding GM farmers liable can be justified 
from a distributional perspective.  
 
4. Conclusions 
Our analysis of externalities and their regulation applied to the special case of GM-crops 
shows that different spatial agglomerations of production may result. In the case where 
transaction costs are low, spatial agglomeration of GM and non GM farms can be 
expected. The empirical relevance of this theoretical result is supported by the 
appearance of GM zones in Germany and non-GM zones in France and Germany, 
although regulations and low transaction costs might not be the major reason for the 
development of non-GM zones (Lavelle, 2005; Beckmann and Wesseler, 2005b). 
However, our results support the argument that liabilities will be important for the 
adoption of transgenic crops.  
The model we presented considers a symmetric case where under one scenario the 
“polluter” has the right and under the other not the right to “pollute”. Under both 
scenarios spatial agglomeration may occur.  
Furtan et al. (2005) report similar results using almost the same approach. They show 
using field data from Canada that economic incentives exist for organic wheat and 
oilseed rape farmers to form a club. Our specification differs from their model as they 
only consider the asymmetric case where the property right is with the GM farmer (as 
provided under the Canadian legislation).  
The extend of spatial agglomeration largely depends on the heterogeneity among 
farmers. This is similar to the results found in the literature on spatial pollution (e.g. 
Goetz and Zilberman, 2000), where the total damage depends on individual farm 
characteristics. In our case the amount of damage the GM-farmer, the “polluter”, 
produces, provides incentives for zoning to reduce the damage, while in most spatial 
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pollution models differences in damages are used to improve the efficiency of 
government control through zonal taxes, zonal permits and/or zonal standards.  
Our results are also similar to those reported on tradable pollution permits, where 
polluters (GM –farmers) have the right (possibility) to buy (compensate) from others 
(non-GM farmers for) additional permits to continue production. In studies on spatial 
pollution and tradable permits polluters in most cases are assumed to be liable for 
violation of government regulations. In this sense our contribution is an extension as we 
consider symmetric responsibilities, although the general argument has already been 
made by Coase in 1960. 
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